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 6 Strategies for Safety 
 Imagine that you are the leader of a healthcare unit or organisation. You are con-
cerned about safety but you have (as always) limited time and resources. You plan a 
programme lasting 1 year initially and perhaps extending to 5 years.
•  What should you do to improve safety? 
•  What safety strategies are available to you? 
•  How can these strategies be most effectively combined? 
 You might fi rst review safety standards in your organisation and the evidence for 
safety improvement. From this you would probably conclude, as we have argued 
earlier, that there are many lapses from basic standards and that the most critical 
task is to improve adherence to basic safety critical procedures. This is of course 
easier said than done but it is the basis of most healthcare safety interventions 
whether this is reducing infection, improving risk assessment, avoiding wrong site 
surgery or improving medication safety. By this point in the book however you will 
have realised the near impossibility of always providing optimal care which corre-
sponds with standards in many, if not most, settings in healthcare. Adherence to 
standards provides an essential foundation but not a complete vision. We may have 
to think a little more broadly. 
 What Options Do We Have for Improving Safety? 
 We should be wary of modelling all future safety interventions on our most visible 
successes. In some highly standardised areas, such as radiotherapy or management 
of blood products, a combination of automation and highly standardised procedures 
combine to deliver genuinely ultra-safe systems. However, at the other extreme, 
consider the care of a patient with psychosis in the community. We cannot, and 
should not, enforce standards and procedures in care that patients and families pro-
vide. The management of risk in such a setting clearly requires a different approach 
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based more on anticipation and detection of incipient problems and a rapid response. 
We have to accept and value greater autonomy and, with this greater freedom, 
comes greater risk. This means that safety strategies need to rely less on rules and 
standards and more on the detection of problems and a rapid response to them. 
 In the remainder of this chapter we outline the main strategies for improving safety 
in healthcare that can be used by our imaginary clinical leader or manager. Our hope is 
that providing a high level architecture of safety strategies will support frontline leaders 
and organisations in devising an effective safety programme. Rather than adopting 
piecemeal solutions we believe that we need to fi rst articulate a high level vision of 
what strategies are available and how they might be employed in each setting. As we 
will see some strategies are most useful in highly standardised areas of work while oth-
ers come to the fore in more fl uid and dynamic environments. None of them in isolation 
necessarily provide a high level of patient safety. The aim is to fi nd a blend of strategies 
and interventions appropriate to the context and the organisation. 
 Five Safety Strategies 
 We outline fi ve broad strategies (Box  6.1 ) each of which is associated with a family 
of interventions. The strategies are, we believe, applicable at all levels of the health-
care system from the frontline to regulation and governance of the system. Two of 
the strategies we discuss aim to optimise the care provided to the patient. The other 
approaches are focused on the management of risk and the avoidance of harm. 
 The fi rst two strategies approaches aim, broadly speaking, to achieve safety by 
optimising care for the patient. In a sense safety and quality and equated; the aim is 
to provide care at levels 1 and 2. Within this general approach we distinguish focal 
safety programmes aimed at specifi c harms or specifi c clinical processes (Safety as 
best practice) and more general attempts to improve work systems and processes 
across a number of clinical settings (Improving the system). These approaches are 
well described in the patient safety literature and we will only briefl y summarise the 
main features here as our primary purpose is to draw attention to other important 
and complementary approaches. 
 Box 6.1 Five Safety Strategies 
 Safety as best practice: aspire to standards – Reducing specifi c harms and 
improving clinical processes 
 Improving healthcare processes and system – Intervening to support indi-
viduals and teams, improve working conditions and organisational 
practices 
 Risk control – Placing restrictions on performance, demand or working 
conditions 
 Improving capacity for monitoring, adaptation and response. 
 Mitigation – Planning for potential harm and recovery. 
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 Optimisation of processes and systems is indeed optimal if it can be made to 
work. The diffi culty is that in the real world optimal care is usually not achievable 
for at least some of the time. Once there is evidence of a substantial departure from 
best practice then the question becomes how best to manage those departures and 
the associated risk. The remaining three approaches are risk management strategies: 
risk control; monitoring, adaptation and response; and mitigation. Optimisation 
strategies improve effi ciency and other aspects of quality as much as they improve 
safety. In contrast risk control, adaptation and recovery strategies are most con-
cerned with improving safety. 
 Safety problems are also sometimes resolved because of the introduction of a 
completely new way of investigating or treating an illness. The development and 
rapid adoption of laparoscopic surgery for instance means that patients no longer 
have large wounds from major incisions, are less vulnerable to infections and have 
a much shorter hospital stay. Reduction of infection is a major safety target but was 
here achieved indirectly by a major surgical innovation. While we recognise that 
innovation often improves safety we do not consider it as a safety strategy, in the 
sense of a plan that can be implemented relatively quickly, because major innova-
tions usually occur over long time periods and can only be implemented once they 
have been tried and tested. 
 Strategy I: Safety as Best Practice 
 The most dramatic safety improvements so far demonstrated have been those with a 
strong focus on a core clinical issue or a specifi c clinical process. They may be 
focussed on the reduction of a specifi c form of harm, such as falls or central line infec-
tions, or increasing the reliability of specifi c clinical processes such as pre- operative 
checks. We originally conceptualised this approach as ‘aspiring to standards’ as we 
regard basic standards and procedures as the foundation of safe systems, though we 
recognise that for an individual patient there is a great deal more to optimal care than 
achieving standards. In our terms ‘best practice’ suggests that a team or organisation 
aims and believes that they can provide care at levels 1 and 2 (Table  6.1 )
 A recent review of the patient safety literature (Shekelle et al.  2011 ) found only 
ten interventions that could be currently recommended for implementation; almost 
 Table 6.1  Safety as best practice: aspire to standards 
 Interventions  Examples 
 Focal safety programme: reduction 
of harm 
 Interventions to reduce central line infections 
 Inpatient falls reduction programmes 
 Interventions to reduce urinary catheter use and infection 
 Interventions to reduce pressure ulcers 
 Improved reliability of targeted 
processes 
 WHO Surgical safety and other checklists 
 Medication reconciliation 
 Care bundles for ventilator associated pneumonia 
 Strategy I: Safety as Best Practice
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all of them would, in our terms, be described as focal safety interventions. The 
essential idea is that complying with proven evidence and standards will produce 
optimal quality and safety. Many patients come to harm because established, scien-
tifi cally based standards of practice are not reliably followed. Safety interventions 
of this kind fi rst marshal the scientifi c evidence, then identify the core practices and 
endeavour to reliably bring these practices to patient care. 
 It sounds simple; one identifi es a standard set of safety critical procedures and 
supports the staff to follow them. However, in practice these are always complex, 
multifaceted interventions encompassing techniques, organisation and leadership 
(Pronovost et al.  2008 ). These interventions are of course far from simple and only 
succeed because of a sophisticated approach to clinical engagement and implemen-
tation (Box  6.2 ). The reduction of central line infections for instance required 
changes to the organisation of care, the equipment used, simplifi cation of guide-
lines, engaging local multidisciplinary teams, a staff education programme, techni-
cal measurement support and a major programme of implementation. 
 Strategy II: Improvement of Work Processes and Systems 
 Accident and incident analysis and other methods reveal a great deal about the vul-
nerabilities in our systems and show us the range of factors which need to be 
addressed if we are to design a safer, high quality healthcare system. Thoughtful 
analyses of serious incidents reveal a range of contributory factors relating to the 
patient, task and technology, staff, team, working environment, organisational and 
institutional environmental factors (Vincent et al.  1998 ). This is the classic territory 
of the organisational accident in which immediate errors and failures are identifi ed 
which are strongly infl uenced by wider organisational factors. These same factors 
 Box 6.2 Improving Safety by Achieving Best Clinical Practice 
•  Explicitly describe the theory behind the chosen intervention or provide an 
explicit logic model for why this patient safety practice should work 
•  Describe the patient safety practice in suffi cient detail that it can be repli-
cated, including the expected effect on staff roles 
•  Detail the implementation process, the actual effects on staff roles, and 
how the implementation or intervention changed over time 
•  Assess the effect of the patient safety practice on outcomes and possible 
unexpected effects, including data on costs when available 
•  For studies with multiple intervention sites, assess the infl uence of context 
on the effectiveness of intervention and implementation 
 Adapted from Shekelle et al. ( 2011 ) 
6 Strategies for Safety
63
also point to the means of intervention and different ways of optimising the health-
care system. For instance Pascale Carayon’s systems engineering approach to 
patient safety emphasizes interactions between people and their environment that 
contribute to performance, safety and health, quality of working life, and the goods 
or services produced (Carayon et al.  2006 ) (Table  6.2 )
 Examples of system improvements which have, amongst other objectives, had 
important impacts on safety include:
•  The introduction of bar coding and decision support in blood collection and 
transfusion (Murphy et al.  2009 ). 
•  The improvement of communication and handover along the surgical pathway 
(de Vries et al.  2010 ) 
•  Using information technology to reduce medication errors (Bates  2000 ; Avery 
et al.  2012 ) 
•  The use of daily goals sheets to improve the reliability of ward care (Pronovost 
et al.  2003 ) 
 The improvement of healthcare systems is a massive topic and there are count-
less examples of analyses and, to a lesser extent, interventions that are within this 
tradition. We cannot describe these in detail and in any case they are extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Carayon  2011 ). Systems engineering, human factors and 
associated disciplines are not restricted to optimisation approaches in that risk 
control, monitoring, adaptation and recovery are sometimes considered. However 
we suggest that the primary drive and focus is optimisation of the healthcare 
system. 
 Table 6.2  Improvement of healthcare system and processes 
 Interventions  Examples 
 Individual staff  Training in key clinical processes 
 Feedback on performance 
 Task interventions  Standardisation and simplifi cation of processes 
 Automation of key processes 
 Improved design and availability of equipment 
 Team standardisation and 
specifi cation 
 Structured handover 
 Formalising roles and responsibilities 
 Clarity of leadership and followership 
 Organisation of ward care 
 Working conditions  Improved lighting 
 Reduction of noise and disturbance 
 Improved work station design 
 Organisational interventions  Improved levels and organisation of staffi ng 
 Creation of new posts to improve coordination of care 
for patients 
 Strategy II: Improvement of Work Processes and Systems
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 Strategy III: Risk Control 
 The next strategy and associated family of interventions is quite different form the 
optimisation approaches discussed above. In many industries safety is achieved 
by avoiding taking unnecessary risks or placing restrictions on the conditions of 
operation. In contrast healthcare seldom imposes limits on either professional 
autonomy or productivity even when safety is severely compromised. Risk con-
trol may seem to provide the answer to all risks, but avoiding risk sometimes 
means losing out on the potential gain that taking the risk may have allowed. 
Increasing risk regulation in hospitals can lead to avoidance of treating higher risk 
conditions, in favour of patients presenting with lower risk (McGivern and Fischer 
 2012 ). Avoidance of risk is not necessarily a good option for patients either as 
there are many circumstances in which clear-sightedly making a risky choice is 
entirely reasonable. However risk control does not aim to prevent a considered, if 
risky, decision but to improve the chances of a good outcome once the decision 
has been taken. 
 Risk control is widely used in other high-risk industries. The safety systems in 
nuclear and other facilities include numerous features which will stop the process if 
conditions become potentially unsafe. Commercial aviation uses a similar approach 
in many circumstances. For example, a storm in Miami will result in all fl ights to 
Miami grounded at their departure airport or diverted to others airports. Safety 
cases, the process by which potential oil and other installations are assessed, are 
almost unknown in healthcare. New clinical facilities are opened, or indeed closed, 
largely on grounds of need and cost without any formal risk assessments. Safety 
cases are designed to offer formal assurance and assessment that the facility can be 
run safely but also set out the conditions under which this can occur and building in 
procedures or automation to restrict activity when necessary. These are all examples 
of risk control by placing limits or restrictions on productive activity in the interests 
of safety (Table  6.3 ).
 Table 6.3  Risk control 
 Interventions  Examples 
 Withdraw services  Close facilities if evidence of serious safety concerns 
 Close facilities temporarily while safety assessments are 
carried out 
 Reduce demand  Reduce overall demand 
 Reduce patient fl ow either temporarily or permanently 
 Place restrictions on services  Restrict services either temporarily or permanently 
 Place restrictions on individuals 
or conditions of operation 
 Defi ne ‘no-go’ conditions for investigations and treatments 
 Withdraw or restrict individual members of staff either 
temporarily or permanently 
 Prioritisation  Select and emphasise safety critical standards while 
allowing some reduction of other work, either temporarily 
or permanently 
6 Strategies for Safety
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 Healthcare does contain examples of risk control but these are seldom discussed 
in the context of patient safety. For instance in 2013 the medical director of the 
British NHS decided to temporarily close a major cardiac surgery unit because there 
were indications of excess mortality. He made it clear that this was just a precaution. 
After a few weeks, following further investigations, the unit reopened. This was 
seen as a very unusual intervention which caused considerable uproar. Yet, in avia-
tion, airports are closed as soon as any substantial risk is identifi ed. 
 Risk control can also be achieved by severely limiting the circumstances in which 
a unit can operate. Consider, for example, the way that the Australian healthcare sys-
tem places very strict limits of what some clinics are allowed to do (New South Wales 
Government Private Facilities  2007 ). Some clinics are only authorised to work in a 
very specifi c medical area, and are staffed and equipped accordingly. Within this area, 
the facility must accept patients and deliver safe care; outside this area, the facility is 
not allowed to deliver care and must transfer all patients to a competent facility. 
 Risk control can include withdrawing services or even closing facilities when 
they have become dangerous. However the main thrust of this approach is to restrict 
the conditions in which investigations or treatment can be given. There are, for 
instance, very strict regulations governing the provision of radiotherapy but almost 
no restrictions on the conditions in which a surgical operation can go ahead. We 
believe that much more consideration should be given to the control of risk to pro-
tect both patients and staff from engaging in unnecessarily risky activities. 
 Strategy IV: Monitoring, Adaptation and Response 
 Safety is achieved partly by attempting to reduce errors but also by actively manag-
ing the problems and deviations that inevitably occur. Once we accept that errors 
and failures occur frequently in any system then we see the need to develop methods 
of monitoring, adapting and responding and recovering from failure. Adapting and 
responding to problems happens all the time in healthcare and is as relevant to man-
agers as to frontline staff. Managers in particularly are constantly ‘fi refi ghting’ and 
resolving problems, but this tends to be done on an ad hoc individual basis. The 
question we address here is whether these often improvised adaptations can evolve 
to become formal safety strategies in the sense of actively building such capacity 
into healthcare systems. Ideally senior clinicians and managers would maintain 
safety at a good level by playing on a palette of known and practiced organisational 
and cultural adjustments. 
 Adapting and responding is much more important in deep sea fi shing than on an 
assembly line but all work requires this capacity to some degree. Being on the look-
out for problems, adapting and working around diffi culties is part and parcel of all 
jobs. In high risk industries such as healthcare the pattern is the same but the stakes 
are much higher and the capacity for rapid response and recovery may literally be a 
matter of life and death. This family of interventions is paradoxically the most used 
in daily work in healthcare but not properly developed as a strategic reality in patient 
safety. 
 Strategy IV: Monitoring, Adaptation and Response
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 The broad capacity of adapting and responding has been discussed extensively in 
the safety literature and made the cornerstone of some approaches to safety such as 
resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al.  2007 ). The term resilience is used in very 
different ways (Macrae  2014 ), sometimes very broadly in an attempt to describe and 
articulate the qualities of a safe organisation and sometimes in a more restricted 
sense of a capacity to adapt and recover from extreme or unusual circumstances. We 
believe that resilience is an important concept that needs serious consideration and 
further research and exploration in practice. However to avoid potential confusion 
we use the more everyday terms of monitoring, adaptation and recovery to denote 
occasions where or hazards or failures have been detected and are being actively 
managed or corrected. 
 We will describe a number of interventions associated with this approach in the 
following chapters and will just give some brief examples here (Table  6.4 ). An 
emphasis on the open discussion of error and system failures by senior leaders is 
enormously important in fostering a willingness to speak up and intervene if a 
patient is at risk. Clinical teams use many adaptive mechanisms, both formal and 
informal, to manage safety on a day to day basis. Anaesthetists for instance have a 
standard repertoire of prepared emergency routines which are called upon in certain 
situations. These routines are only seldom used and are deliberately honed and stan-
dardised so that they can be adhered to at times of considerable stress. At an organ-
isational level we could see preparations for a possible infection outbreak in a 
similar way (Zingg et al.  2015 ). Briefi ngs and debriefi ngs can be used by ward staff, 
operating theatre teams and healthcare managers to monitor day to day threats to 
safety. For example, briefi ngs carried out by operating theatre teams provide an 
opportunity to identify and resolve equipment, staffi ng, theatre list order issues 
before a case starts. Debriefi ngs carried out at the end of the theatre list support 
refl ective learning on what went well and what could be done better tomorrow. 
 Table 6.4  Improve capacity for monitoring, adaptation and response 
 Interventions  Examples 
 Improve safety culture  Patient and family engagement 
 Culture of openness about error and failure 
 Monitoring, adaptation and response in 
clinical teams 
 Rapid response to deterioration 
 Develop emergency response systems and 
routines 
 Develop team cross checking and safety 
monitoring 
 Building briefi ng and anticipation into clinical 
routines 
 Improve management of organisational 
pressures and priorities 
 Develop methods of predicting times of staff 
shortage and other pressures 
 Improve managerial capacity to deal with 
dangerous situations 
 Regulatory compromises and adaptation  Negotiate time to move to new standards 
 Actively manage safety during time of transition 
6 Strategies for Safety
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Increasingly, briefi ngs and debriefi ngs are being introduced in other healthcare 
domains such as safeguarding adults and mental health teams (Vincent et al.  2013 ).
 Strategy V: Mitigation 
 Mitigation is the action of reducing the severity, seriousness, or painfulness of some 
event. This strategy accepts that patients and indeed staff will sometimes be seri-
ously affected or harmed during their healthcare and, critically, that the organisation 
concerned then has a responsibility to mitigate that harm. In particular we believe 
that organisations need to have effective systems in place to support patients, carers 
and staff in the aftermath of serious failures and harm. This is perhaps the most 
neglected aspect of patient safety (Table  6.5 ).
 Accepting risk in healthcare seems at fi rst glance to either be an admission of 
defeat or a cynical disregard for patients. However this strategy is rather more subtle 
and more important than one might think both at the clinical and organisational 
level. Planning for these occasions can seem to indicate a resigned acceptance of 
harm; in reality planning for recovery is humanitarian and necessary. A complete 
approach to safety must include the mitigation of harm, although managing com-
plaints and litigation should not dominate attempts to improve safety. 
 Organisations of all kinds must insure against risk, deal with complaints and liti-
gation, and manage the media and regulatory response Organisations must also 
make insurance arrangements for compensation to injured patients. At a national 
level countries develop medical insurance systems, such as no-fault compensation, 
to support patients who have been harmed. In most countries, the challenge of 
addressing error in medicine demands a thorough reconsideration of the legal mech-
anisms currently used to deal with error and harm in health care. 
 The basic needs of injured patients have been understood for 20 years (Vincent 
et al.  1994 ). We would all, in varying degrees, like an apology, an explanation, to 
know that steps had been taken to prevent recurrence and potentially fi nancial and 
 Table 6.5  Mitigation 
 Interventions  Examples 
 Support for patients and carers  Rapid response and clear communication 
 Designated follow up, psychological and physical support 
 Plan clinical services for response to known 
complications 
 Support for staff  Peer to peer support programmes 
 Temporary relief from clinical duties 
 Provision of longer term support 
 Financial, legal and media 
response 
 Insurance of organisation 
 Legal protection for organisation against unwarranted 
claims 
 Capacity for rapid and proactive media response 
 Strategy V: Mitigation
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practical assistance. Many patients experience errors during their treatment, whether 
they realise it or not, and some are harmed by healthcare. The harm may be minor, 
involving only inconvenience or discomfort, but can involve serious disability or 
death. Almost all bad outcomes will have some psychological consequences for 
both patients and staff, ranging from minor worry and distress through to depression 
and even despair. The experiences of these people tend not to be fully appreciated, 
and yet understanding the impact of such injuries is a prerequisite of providing use-
ful and effective help (Vincent  2010 ). Healthcare organisations generally have 
extremely limited services to support either patients or staff in the aftermath of 
adverse events. 
 We know too that staff suffer a variety of consequences from being the ‘second 
victim’ as Albert Wu eloquently expressed it, not implying that the experiences of 
staff were necessarily comparable to those of injured patients (Wu  2000 ). We should 
also consider that a member of staff who has been seriously affected may well be 
performing poorly and be a risk to future patients; this again is rarely addressed. 
There are a few pioneering examples of programmes of support for both patients 
and staff (Van Pelt  2008 ) but this is an area of safety management which needs 
substantial development. We consider that this should be a core safety strategy; 
planning for recovery should include this core humanitarian element as well as 
managing risk and reputation. 
 Innovation 
 Safety problems are sometimes resolved because of the introduction of a com-
pletely new way of investigating or treating an illness or a new way of providing 
and organising care. Innovation in healthcare can take many forms, ranging from 
drug therapies, surgical procedures, devices, and tests, through to new forms of 
health professional training, patient education, management, fi nancing and service 
delivery models. These innovations generally aim to provide better or more effi -
cient care for patients, but safety may also be improved as a virtuous side effect of 
the action 
 Healthcare is remarkable in the breadth and pace of innovation which both 
improves safety and, as we have argued earlier, also changes the boundaries of what 
is acceptable and so creates new safety problems. The pace of innovation is such 
that medical knowledge dates extremely rapidly. In 2007, the median time before 
medical knowledge needed signifi cant updating was only 5 years; 23 % of system-
atic reviews needed updating within 2 years and 15 % within 1 year (Shojania et al. 
 2007 ). According to both the United Kingdom National Institute of Clinical 
Excellence and the American Heart Association most recommendations and treat-
ment guidelines need substantial adjustment every 5 years (Alderson et al.  2014 ; 
Neuman et al.  2014 ). 
 Many innovations in diagnosis and treatment have had a major positive impact 
on safety. For example safety in anaesthesia has improved about ten-fold over the 
last past 20 years, with the consensus being that the greatest safety gains have arisen 
6 Strategies for Safety
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from the introduction of new drugs and techniques for monitoring and for regional 
and ambulatory anaesthesia (Lanier  2006 ). The rapid introduction and spread of 
laparoscopic surgery has reduced length of stay, led to more rapid recovery and 
reduced risk of infection and other problems (Shabanzadeh and Sørensen  2012 ). 
 Safety may also be improved indirectly through the reorganisation of the health-
care system, particularly through realignment to a more patient centred vision. 
Many failures of care in community settings are due to failures of coordination and 
communication between agencies and across different parts of the system. One 
aspect of the ‘burden of treatment’ (Mair and May  2014 ) experienced by patients 
and families is that they have to organise and coordinate their own care to compen-
sate for the failures of the healthcare system. If we succeed in developing more 
integrated systems of care across settings and populations these problems should 
reduce. Patients will be safer and experience fewer failures although the changes are 
not specifi cally targeted at safety. 
 Innovation is not really a safety strategy, although safety interventions may be 
innovative. New treatments or technologies are usually targeted at wider benefi ts for 
patients with reduction of risk being a secondary benefi t. More importantly in this 
context ‘innovation’ cannot be deployed as a strategy in the same way as optimisation, 
control and recovery. Our imaginary chief executive with a 3–5 year time horizon can-
not rely on innovation to solve safety problems but must nevertheless to alert to new 
developments that may change the nature of the problems that they are facing. 
 To sum up, innovation is a good example of a double-edged tool for safety. On 
the one hand, it is a critical determinant and means (perhaps the most signifi cant) of 
improving safety in the long term. Innovation may also introduces new risks as well 
as resolving old ones particularly in the short term during the period of transition 
and disruption (Dixon-Woods et al.  2011 ). Safety may be degraded in the short term 
due to rapid diffusion of insuffi ciently tested new methods and uncontrolled indi-
vidual experimentation. 
 Selection and Customisation of Strategies to Clinical Context 
 We hope that the delineation of the fi ve strategies and their associated interventions 
is useful as a way of thinking through the approaches that might be taken to manage 
risk in any particular healthcare environment. These very broad strategies are sel-
dom explicitly distinguished and some safety programmes unwittingly combine 
several types of strategy with somewhat different objectives. We believe that many 
situations do require a combination of different approaches but that it needs to be 
clear how and why each strategy is deployed (Fig.  6.1 ). We also need to consider 
how these strategies and associated interventions might be combined and in what 
proportions. Each clinical environment brings its own challenges and requires a dif-
ferent combination. We have set out three broad models of clinical work to illustrate 
this and others may need to be articulated. The management of risk in the commu-
nity for instance in highly distributed health and social care systems may require a 
different kind of approach.
 Selection and Customisation of Strategies to Clinical Context
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 The following chapters begin to explore these ideas in more detail by providing 
examples of safety strategies in different settings. We can however illustrate the 
general idea which is that after an initial stage of diagnosis of the safety problem, 
illustrated by our approach to safety measurement and monitoring, the ‘lens’ of the 
clinical context will inform the particular strategy blend (see Fig.  6.1 ). In settings 
where care can be precisely defi ned and delineated strategies to control exposure to 
risk and maintain standards will predominate, hopefully accompanied by concur-
rent strategies to improve working conditions and support staff. In contrast in more 
fl uid and dynamic environment strategies to improve monitoring and adaptation 
may be more to the fore, although all environments require a solid procedural under-
pinning. The next three chapters develop and illustrate these ideas in the context of 
hospital, home and primary care. 















Context Strategy blend 
 Fig. 6.1  Analysis, context and strategies 
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 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
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